​Carranza laid out his case for a grand conspiracy between the Americans and the Huertistas:

First, Carranza maintained that the local police force that presently controlled the port had been organized by the Americans during the occupation and consisted mostly of political refugees from the Huerta government, “such as agents Villavicencio, Bolanos, Velez, etc.”

Hence, taken together, we have clear proof that as of September 22—the stated "two months" before the American evacuation—there were no Constitutionalists "working alongside" or under the Americans, nor were there any plans for them to do so in the future, in spite of what Professor Hart claims. Moreover, as of November 8, 1914, General Funston was still worried about the prospect of having to fight the Constitutionalists. And on the eve of the American evacuation, First Chief Carranza suspected a conspiracy by the Americans to leave the port "in the hands of the enemies of the Constitutionalist government," the polar opposite of what Professor Hart alleges.

Professor John Mason Hart is the author of a conspiracy theory alleging that the United States Army colluded with the Constitutionalist Army during its occupation of Veracruz in 1914. However, this theory is born of 1.) shoddy research, 2.) an overactive imagination, and 3.) either inexplicable incompetence or downright deception. See John Mason Hart, Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 298 & 426, end note 44.

U.S. National Archives Record Group 94, Entry 25, File number 2149991, Box 7478.

U.S. National Archives Record Group 165, 5761-1091/19, November 22, 1914

Third, Carranza confessed to being “at a loss to know how it is possible that these troops are well provided with arms and machine guns as they really are,” insinuating that either the Americans had armed these ex-Federals, or permitted them to be re-armed using the war materiel known to exist inside the port.​

Only the rankest amateur "historian" would presume revolutionaries to have "cadets" marching around with swords.

The fact that these men were "proceeding from San Juan de Ulúa" at this date should also have been a clue that these were not Constitutionalist officers.

The Secretary of War characterizes Funston's "suggestion...with respect to having new officials working in the respective offices under or with our officials" as "inadvisable."

1. Professor Hart found these documents (National Archives and Records Administration. Military Government of Veracruz, Record Group 141, Entry 12, File 222) and presumed that these officers were Constitutionalists, when in fact they were Federal Army officers, and imagined a conspiracy.

U.S. National Archives Record Group 94, Entry 25, File number 2149991, Box 7478.

However, officials of the U.S. government ALWAYS referred to the Constitutionalists as "rebels," "insurrectionists," "revolutionists," or something similar, and ALWAYS reserved the term "Mexican Army" for the Federals.

Here Funston requests permission for the Mexican government (this was before the Convention, and the Constitutionalist Army was the only governing authority in Mexico with national reach) to appoint officials and have them report to him "to work until evacuation" so that they would have "sufficient time to familarize with their duties."

J de M. I. (Jefe de Muelle Inglés), or "Head of the English Dock"

Instead, Carranza proposed that the Americans should hand over military control to General Cándido Aguilar, “in the same manner as he has made delivery of the Civil Departments.”

That civilian handover did not turn out so well, since as soon as the Americans started to leave on November 23 the Mexican civilian employees abandoned their posts.

Funston mentions "cordial relations with [Constitutionalist] General Aguilar but his subordinate General Millán...has shown bad disposition and appears inclined to make trouble."

Simply because Admiral Badger allowed these officers to appear in public under arms, Hart imagined that the Americans were in cahoots with these Mexican officers.

3. Professor Hart stated that the U.S. Army's "generals consistently expressed the anti-Villa and pro-Carranza actions of and sentiments of the [Wilson] administration." (Hart, Revolutionary Mexico, p. 424) Here, we see General Funston remark on his "cordial relations" with Constitutionalist General Cándido Aguilar, immediately followed by Funston's concern over the aggressive behavior of Aguilar's subordinate, General Agustín Millán, and fears of the possibility of having to fight against Jesús Carranza's Constitutionalist 2nd Division of the Center. It is inconceivable that Hart missed this exchange while he was doing his research and it is proof positive that the Constitutionalists had an adversarial relationship with the Americans. They were not inside the plaza colluding with them.

4. As if this were not enough, we have an exchange between the Military Governor of Veracruz, General Funston, and Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison where the former requests permission for Constitutionalists to work under the Americans in preparation of the turnover. The request is categorically denied. This is definitive proof that there were no Constitutionalists "working alongside" the Americans.

U.S. National Archives Record Group 94, Entry 25, File number 2149991, Box 7478.

Hart writes on page 426, end note 44, "For one of the many [actually, this is the only one] references to the Constitutionalist officers working with the Americans at the port and their names, see File 222, Entry 12, Correspondence of the Administrator of Customs and Captain of the Port, April-November, 1914, Records Group 141, MGV, WNRC." Yet these men were all Federal Army officers, listed in the Federal Army Escalafón (seniority listing) as assigned to San Juan de Ulúa prison, and mentioned in Federal Army General Gustavo Maass' report of the invasion of Veracruz.

See Maass' report in the Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Defensa Nacional XI/481.5/315.258-260, and Departamento de Estado Mayor, Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Guerra y Marina, Escalafón General del Ejército: Cerrado hasta 31 de Enero de 1914 (México: Talleres del Departamento de Estado Mayor), 1914, p. 178 regarding Colonel Vigil and his assignment.

To operate under the delusion that these were Constitutionalist officers is simply gross ignorance and shoddy research.​

2. Professor Hart found this one single document (National Archives and Records Administration. Military Government of Veracruz, Entry 19, Box 21, File A) and concluded that "A. GON_ALEZ" had to refer to Constitutionalist General Alejo González, as though he were the only González in Mexico with the first initial "A," and even though at the time he was a regimental commander in Cesáreo Castro's brigade advancing on Mexico City, and no port authority in its right mind would have assigned a rancher from Coahuila to supervise the important Muelle Inglés ("English Dock").

Funstion mentions his fear that Constitutionalist General Jesús Carranza's troops' possible "intention is to fight us."

JOHN MASON HART CONCLUDES THAT THE U.S. COLLUDES WITH THE CONSTITUTIONALISTS

Since many Americans openly favored Villa over Carranza, the First Chief was concerned that the Americans were facilitating a new alliance between the Villistas and ex-Huertistas, which was actually occurring in other places of the Republic:

"By abandoning the port they would practically deliver it to the Huerta element, who to-day pretend to call themselves Villa followers."

5. Finally, here is a declassified letter (significantly typed in all caps) dated November 22, 1914, Córdoba, Veracruz, sent from First Chief Venustiano Carranza to the Americans the day before they were set to leave. The First Chief was furious because General Funston intended to evacuate the port of Veracruz “by simply leaving the city without making proper delivery of the port, and this action would amount to leaving that city in the hands of enemies of the Constitutionalist government.”

Note the date of August 1, 1914, then read this memo from General Funston, U.S. military governor of Veracruz, to the U.S. Army Chief of Staff of the same date, where he mentions a number of Federal--not Constitutionalist--generals in Veracruz and the possibility ("I know that I would be afraid to entrust any part of the line to them") of employing the Federals in a forced battle against the Constitutionalists, "should they" drive the remnants of the Federal Army to Veracruz and then "demand entry or that the interned troops be surrendered to them." It was a prospect that Funston did not relish since "Against four or five times our number of such troops as the rebels [Constitutionalists] have shown themselves to be we would have a red-hot time of it."

Second, under these Huertista policemen, the remainder of Huerta’s army that had revolted in Puebla on August 21, 1914—that is, subsequent to the signing of the Treaties of Teoloyucan and the official surrender of the Federal Army—had been permitted to take up residence in the port under the command of General Higinio Aguilar.